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ABSTRACT

In this survey of student and faculty attitudes and behavior concerning the crisis at Columbia University, a sample of 2,000 faculty and 1/5 of the student body registered in the college and the graduate and professional schools at the Morningside campus were sent questionnaires. The purpose of the questionnaire was to find out their experiences and their opinions about what had been taking place. A summary of the results included: (1) Only a small minority favored the tactic of the demonstrators; a majority favor some of their major stated goals, and advocate wide extension of faculty, student, and neighborhood resident participation in university policymaking. (2) The great majority of students and faculty believe that the police action involved excessive police violence, although opinions vary about how widespread the violence was. (3) The effect of the police action was to increase acceptance of the sit-in demonstrations as justified by the small majority to a somewhat larger minority of both faculty and students. (4) The administration is widely criticized for not negotiating further, but there is widespread mistrust of the demonstrations' leaders. (5) The crisis greatly increased communications within the university. (Author)



THE COLUMBIA CRISIS: CAMPUS, VIETNAM, AND THE GHETTO

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July 1, 1968

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Summary

- 1. Only a small minority favored the tactics of the sit-in demonstrators; a majority favor some of their major stated goals, and advocate wide extension of faculty, student, and neighborhood resident participation in university policy making. The small minority is a large number in absolute terms, quite enough to create a major disruption of normal activities on campus.
- 2. The great majority of students and faculty believe that the police action involved excessive police violence, although opinions vary about how widespread the violence was.
- 3. The effect of the police action was to increase acceptance of the sit-in demonstrations as justified from a small minority to a somewhat larger minority of both faculty and students; but not to change attitudes very much on the major stated issues.
- 4. The administration is widely criticized for not negotiating further; but there is widespread mistrust of the sit-in demonstrations leaders. Neither side came out with much approval.
- 5. Attitudes toward the crisis are strongly related to dissatisfaction with the educational content and impersonality of the University.
- 6. The crisis greatly increased communications within the University, particularly direct, face-to-face talking about University problems; both students and faculty feel that whatever else happened, faculty-student relations are better than they were.
- 7. Attitudes toward the demonstrations and their goals are strongly related to attitudes toward the war in Viet Nam, but completely unrelated to the draft status of the individual student.
- 8. The political preferences of the anti-war, anti-poverty majority of students and faculty have so far offered them a legitimate outlet for protest in the larger society, but this may now be foreclosed, with radical consequences.



THE COLUMBIA CRISIS: CAMPUS, VIETNAM AND THE GHETTO

A Survey of Student and Faculty Attitudes and Behavior at Columbia University*

Allen H. Barton
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Issues

In the spring of 1968 several issues converged on the Columbia campus. continuing war and the elimination of exemption for graduating seniors and firstyear graduate students intensified anti-war activities. These included mass demonstrations and blockades directed against military recruiting and training on campus, the Dow Chemical Corporation recruiters, and official University membership in the Institute for Defense Analysis, a military research consortium. The University's program of expansion in the neighborhood, involving buying out single-room occupancy housing and also elimination of some older regular apartment buildings had been protested over the years by some groups of local residents and student sympathizers on the grounds that it deprived poor and black people of housing and reduced the degree of racial and economic integration of the neighborhood. The University's plan to construct a gymnasium on land leased from the city in Morningside Park, between Harlem and Morningside Heights, had created several issues: whether the park land should be built on at all, whether the \$3,000 rent to the city, and the University's provision of 16% of the space in the gym for Harlem residents, was an equitable arrangement or a "land grab" and a case of "gym crow."

Events

On Tuesday, April 23, the Students for a Democratic Society called a rally at the sundial in the center of campus to protest the disciplining of six of its

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leaders for conducting an indoor demonstration against the IDA, indoor demonstrations being against the rules laid down by the President. The crowd Went to Morningside Park where they knocked down a fence around the gym construction site, clashed with the police, and one member was arrested. They then returned to the campus and occupied Hamilton Hall, the classroom and administration building of the undergraduate College. The group, then a coalition of black members of the Student Afro-American Society and the mainly white SDS, surrounded Acting Dean Coleman's office so that he couldn't get out. During Tuesday night the black students asked the white radicals to leave, on the grounds that they weren't prepared to go far enough in resisting the University and the Blacks would take a stand as Black students. The white radicals then, early in the dawn, broke into the main administration building. Low Library, and occupied President Kirk's office, where they searched his files and copied correspondence which interested them. During Wednesday they stayed barricaded in, expecting police action to remove them, which never came. Dean Coleman was eventually released after a 24 hour seige. Wednesday night the University ordered the campus buildings closed, but the Architecture students sat in at their class building, Avery Hall, to protest building in the park. Early Thursday morning a mixed group of mainly graduate students took over the social science classroom building Fayerweather. Early Friday morning a group from Fayerweather moved into the Mathematics building, joined by twenty of the Low demonstrators. By Friday morning, red flags floated in the sun over Fayerweather and Mathematics. Communes were formed, and an intense group life went on in the "liberated" buildings.

An "Ad Hoc Faculty Committee" formed, trying to negotiate a withdrawal of the sit-ins and to interpose themselves between the students and any police action. They also manned the gates of the campus to keep unauthorized people out. Black militants in Harlem made threats of action if the University used



force against the black students in Hamilton. Thursday night the Ad Hoc Committee put a line of faculty members in front of Low, and some were hit and knocked down by plain-clothes police who charged through them into the building early Friday morning. After this the police did not try to remove students from the buildings, and negotiations began. The sit-ins developed a central Strike Coordinating Committee which formulated six demands, including one for complete amnesty for all the sit-ins. A "Majority Coalition" of stidents formed to protest the sit-ins, and to threaten counter-action against them.

The President called an unprecedented general meeting of the joint faculties on Sunday, April 28, which passed a resolution opposing the sit-ins and calling for reform in the University structure, and then adjourned without any provision for further faculty action. On Monday the Ad Hoc Committee formulated a compromise proposal and demanded that both sides accept it. The "Majority Coalition" blockaded the sending of food to the Low Library sit-ins, and there were clashes between them and the supporters of the demonstrations who tried to crash their line with food. The faculty Ad Hoc Committee maintained a white-armbanded line to keep peace around the buildings. A small Harlem group assembled at the East gate of the campus and made demands and threats. By evening the Strike Coordinating Committee had contemptously rejected the compromise suggested by the Ad Hoc Faculty Committee, insisting that the University administration had no legitimate authority and that complete amnesty was the necessary condition for any negotiation on other issues. The administration on its part conceded certain points but maintained a good deal of ambiguity on others.

Monday night around midnight a force of over 1000 police assembled near the campus, in addition to the forces which had been patrolling the campus and the



gates. By careful prearrangement, one group moved through tunnels into Hamilton and arrested the black students, who left peacefully to be booked at the police station. In the other buildings students divided into several groups according to whether they would come out when requested, resist passively (by going limp and refusing to walk out under orders but accepting being carried out), or resist more actively (apparently by locking arms and trying to prevent themselves from being carried out.) The police broke through lines of faculty peace-keepers and student sympathizers, and the barricades of furniture. There was much confusion, and many non-resisting students were beaten; the police claim that they were struck and things were thrown at them. After several hours all the buildings had been cleared and the students, some of them with minor wounds, taken to police stations and booked; all were released with or without bail during the Toward four in the morning the police for some reason charged a large group of spectators and demonstration sympathizers on the south side of the campus, knocking many down and forcing them against a locked gate. Eventually the crowd left the campus and stood on the street outside, where they were again charged, by mounted police.

By Tuesday morning the campus was in a state of outrage against the police. A general student strike was called, which was respected by most faculty and students to the extent that such classes as met did so outdoors or in offices, not classrooms. The Ad Hoc committee effectively went out of business, its mediating efforts a failure. A new official meeting of the faculties that afternoon rejected resolutions either endorsing or condemning the Administration's actions, and voted to express their anguish at the extremes to which the situation had come, to have the disciplinary proceedings growing out of the crisis handled by a tripartite student-faculty-administration committee, and to create an Executive Committee of the faculties to try to restore peace to the campus and make recommendations for the future.



The Survey

At this point the Bureau of Applied Social Research decided to undertake a large-scale survey of both students and faculty, to find out their experiences and their opinions on what had been taking place. As pointed out in the letter which accompanied the questionnaire, the results would be immediately made available to all groups as a means of facilitating communications on the campus. Two thousand questionnaires went to the entire faculty mailing list (excluding Barnard College and Teachers College which are not formally part of the University, and schools not at the Morningside campus, such as the medical faculties and the school of Social Work). This list included senior faculty, junior and part-time faculty, a small number of full-time administrators, and some senior research personnel attached to departments and laboratories. A random sample of 1/5 of the student body registered in the College and the graduate and professional schools at the Morningside campus was sent questionnaires which were identical to the faculty except for adaptations of the background information.

Within the first week about 1/3 of each group had responded, and by three weeks the figure was approximately half. The final figure is going to be about 60 to 65% returns; a telephone check on key opinions and experiences among the non-returners is being made. Comparison of early and later returns does not show much difference or any significant trend, so the results based on those who returned the questionnaires should be roughly accurate for the whole population. The precise figures may be off by five or ten percent as a result of non return bias, but the general shape of the findings should be correct. Where there is a large majority in our figures there is almost certainly a large majority in the total population; where figures are close to 50-50, the population is undoubtedly divided; and the correlations of one variable with another are probably quite accurate.



1. Only a small minority favored the tactics of the sit-in demonstrators; a majority favor some of their major stated goals, and advocate wide extension of faculty, student, and neighborhood residents participation in University policy making.

Faculty and students were asked two very broad questions on goals and tactics, which had also been asked of students during the Berkeley "free speech" crisis in 1964:

"Were you for or against the main goals of the demonstration?"

"Were you for or against the tactics of the demonstration?"

		Faculty	Students	(Berkeley students 1964)*
Main goals:	For Against Undecided	51% 31 18 100	58% 26 <u>16</u> 100	63% 27 10 100
Tactics:	For Against Undecided	10% 77 13	19% 68 13	34% 61

Support of the goals was by a 2 to 1 margin among the students, and by a 5 to 3 margin among the faculty; the student figures are comparable to those at Berkeley in the Free Speech crisis. The tactics, on the other hand, were rejected by overwhelming majorities of both students and faculty, and received support of only about half as many students as the Berkeley sit-ins, less than 1/5 of all students.



Data provided by Professor Robert Somers; see "Mainsprings of the Rebellion," in S. M. Lipset and Sheldon S. Wolin, <u>The Berkeley Student Revolt</u> (New York: Doubleday, 1965).

The faculty sample actually included all teaching positions from full professor to teaching assistant, plus some research and administrative personnel. If we break it down by rank, we find that social stratification is operating in a familiar manner: the highest ranks are less favorable to change in the University, and to use of illegal tactics to achieve it.

	Favor goals of demonstration	Favor tactics of demonstration	Number responding
Full-time teaching			
Full Professors	48%	1%	177
Associate Professors	47%	5%	95
Assistant Professors	64%	9%	99
Instructors	71%	22%	53
Part-time teaching*			
Lecturers	61%	13%	47
Associates	60%	11%	32
Preceptors	60%	15%	59
Teaching Assistants	5 3 %	15%	101
Research & Administrat	10n 46%	14%	193
Total:	51%	10%	916

^{*} Lecturers and Associates may teach full time, but most do not; Preceptors and Teaching Assistants are all part-time.

The basic tactic was of course the sit-in, which prevented normal use of classrooms and administrative offices. We asked specifically about two tactics which went beyond the simple sit-in: the holding of a Dean prisoner overnight in one of the buildings, and the breaking into and copying of the files of the President.



"How do you feel about the holding captive of Acting Dean Coleman in Hamilton for a day -- was it definitely justified, probably justified, probably unjustified, definitely unjustified?"

"How do you feel about the sit-ins examining and copying of President Kirk's files in his office at Low?"

		Students		
	A11	Full Professors	Instruc- tors	•
Holding Coleman captive: Definitely or probably justified	7%	1%	8%	1 1 %
Examining and copying Kirk files: Definitely or probably justified	11%	2%	19%	17%

It is clear that only a tiny minority felt these specific tactics were justified. However it may be considered a measure of the tolerance of militant, illegal action that anyone would accept these tactics. Their relationship to faculty rank was similar to the general tactics (sestion -- support went up as rank went down.

It is here that the importance of <u>proportions</u> compared with <u>absolute</u> <u>numbers</u> must be reconsidered. In a referendum or an election, 19% of the vote does not amount to much. If moved to take physical action, on the other hand, 19% of 17,000 students amounts to 3,250 people -- a formidable picket line, sit-in group, or crowd. If the remaining 81% were likewise motivated to take physical action, the result might be a smashing victory for the majority in a pushing match or a fight. But as long as the majority remain passive, a minority of 19% can completely tie up a campus; while if part of the majority is activated, or the police are called, the minority can turn the campus into a battleground. It is a question of intensity of motivation, and willingress to go beyond the normal rules of campus politics to take physical action through sit-ins, blockades, and similar uses of force.



The sit-ins proclaimed a list of six demands. Of these, faculty and students gave the strongest support to stopping the construction of the gym, creating a joint student-faculty disciplinary committee, and dropping charges from previous gym site demonstrations. The elimination of remaining ties with the Institute for Defense Analysis produced nearly even division. The right to conduct indeer demonstrations and the demand for amnesty, got only minority support, particularly the amnesty, which the strike leaders had made their precondition to a settlement.

"Should the Administration now agree to:		Faculty	Students	
	A11	Full professors	Instruc- tors	
All judicial decisions on student discipline to be made at open hearings with due process, judged by a bi-partite committee of students and faculty	69%	58%	73%	78%
Stopping construction of Columbia gym in Morningside park permanently	64	64	87	61
University dropping legal charges against demonstrators arrested at gym site	58	52	79	58
President Kirk and Trustee Burden to sever all connection with Executive Board of Institute for Defense Analysis	46	42	73	50
Elimination of rule against all demonstrations inside buildings	31	14	42	39
No disciplinary action against anyone in the demonstration (amnesty)"	22	10	40	30



The issue of basic changes in the University structure was not part of the immediate demands of the sit-in demonstrators, except for the point dealing with student-faculty decision-making on disciplinary action, which was the most popular of all the six demands. However we asked some general questions about student, faculty, and trustee power.

"How much decision-making power should students, faculty, administration,* and trustees have in making major University policies?"

Faculty answers:	The most power	Equal power	Some power	No power but be consulted regularly	No influence at all	No answer	
Students should have:	0	9	46	40	2	3	100%
Faculty should have:	28	44	22	1	0	5	100%
Trustees should have:	23	40	24	6	2	5	100%
Student answers:							
Students should have:	.6	23	48	25	1	2	100%
Faculty should have:	22	54	20	1	-	3	100%
Trustees should have:	21	42	22	9	2		100%



The administration got left out of the response categories in typing the questionnaire; there was no conscious intent to abolish it.

By combining the responses on student, faculty, and trustee power we can obtain a set of desired patterns:

	Faculty	Students
Trustees should have most power	25%	20%
Trustees and faculty equal	31	28
Faculty most	26	22
Trustees, faculty and students equal	4	10
Faculty and students equal	3	10
Other answers	11 100%	10

The problem of Columbia's relations with its neighborhood have been among the most vexing and controversial in recent years. There are various associations of local residents, there are elected representatives from the districts in which Columbia is situated, and there are City planning agencies, but there does not appear to be any satisfactory mechanism yet for handling the relations between a large institution and its neighbors. The problem is complicated by the fact that some of the land involved in University expansion is Columbia owned; other areas involved are privately owned but subject to city-approved urban renewal plans, and both Morningside and Riverside parks are of course city property.

Our question on this subject was a rather general one about participation in decisions which did not try to spell out the mechanisms for such participation or the boundaries of the "community."



"In matters affecting the community around Columbia, such as plans for use of land, relocation of tenants, nature of new housing, etc., how much decision-making power should representatives of local residents, the University, and the City have?"

Faculty answers:	The most power	Equal power	Some power	No power but be consulted regularly	No influence at all	No answer	<u> </u>
Local residents should have:	4	32	34	24	1	5	100%
University as a whole	: 29	46	17	2	· _	6	100%
City government:	10	39	36	10	-	5	100%
Student answers:							
should have:	9	42	28	17	2	2	100%
University as a whole	: 23	54	16	3	2.	3	100%
City government:	12	40	31	14	1	2	100%

About half of the students and over a third of the faculty members answering favor some form of at least equal power for "local residents" in dealing with the Columbia expansion and relocation activities, and a large majority favor giving them at least "some power." In the absence of legitimate local government bodies within the city, for neighborhoods and for larger districts like Harlem, it is not at all clear how such a desire for joint decision-making could be implemented.



2. The great majority of students and faculty believe that the police action involved excessive police violence, although opinions vary about how widespread the violence was.

About 32% of the students and 33% of the faculty members responding so far were on the campus the night of the "bust." Of those present that night, 70% of the students and 54% of the faculty members report that they saw the police hit, push, or charge into groups of people on the campus. About half of the students present and about 40% of the faculty present report that they themselves were struck, pushed, or in groups that were charged at by the police, mainly the latter.

There was very general agreement that there was at least some excessive use of force by the police; a strong majority of those who were present and saw the force used characterize it as "greatly excessive to the point of brutality," and a somewhat smaller majority of them say that it was widespread and involved many of the police.

From what you have seen, heard, or read, was the police use of force:

	Faculty		St	•		
	Total	Saw force used	Did not	Total	Saw force used	Did not
Reasonable in view of the situation	21	11	25	17	7	19
Somewhat excessive	36	23	40	30	19	36
Greatly excessive to the point of brutality	36	66	28	49	74	41
Don't know	7	0	7	4	0	4
	100	100	100	100	100	100



"What was your impression of how many police used excessive violence.

	Faculty			Students		
	Total,	Saw force used	Did not	Total	Saw force used	Did not
Excessive violence did not occur	G	2	6	4	2	5
There were isolated incidents of excessive violence only	40	29	46	37	29	43
There was widespread use of excessive violence involving many police	32	57	23	42	61	36
Don't know"	22	12	25_	<u> 17</u>	. 8	16
	100	100	100	100	100	100

'What is your impression of the use of violence against police by the demonstrators:

	Faculty			Students			
	Total	Saw force used	Did	Total	Saw force used	Did not	
Violence by demonstrator against police did not occur	rs 10	29	5	10	17	5	
There were isolated incidents of violence by demonstrators against police	52	46	55	61	69	63	
There was widespread use of violence by demonstrators against	7	0	7	6	0	0	
police	•	2		_	2	8	
Don't know"	30	23	33	23	12	24	
	100	100	100	100	100	100	



Those students and faculty who were present and saw he police in action were, to be sure, a highly self-selected group. We constructed an index of predispositions, based on answers to several questions concerning how people felt about the demonstrations and their goals before the police action. First of all it becomes clear how much self-selection there was in seeing the police in action against individuals or groups:

	Percent who saw police	use force
Among these whose predispositions are:	Faculty	Students
Anti-demonstration -5	2 %	8%
-4 , -3	9%	15%
-2, -1	11%	22%
0	19%	26%
+1, +2	36%	28%
+3, +4	44%	44%
Pro-demonstration +5	54%	57%

Now if we compare the proportion who report the use of force as 'brutal," holding constant the predispositions, it appears that most of the difference between those who did and did not see the use of force is due to predispositions.

	Fac	Faculty			Students		
	Saw force	Did not	%	Saw force	Did not	t %	
Predisposition:	used	see	Diff.	used	see	Diff.	
Anti: -5	*	3%	*	20%	6%	+14	
-4, -3	32%	10%	+22	29%	15%	+14	
-2, -1	36%	22%	+14	40%	34%	+ 6	
0	44%	30%	+14	72%	49\$	+23	
+1, +2	65%	66%	- 1	81%	65%	+16	
+3. +4	82%	72%	+10	94%	81%	+13	
Pro: +5	91%	89%	+ 2	96%	89%	+ 7	
Total:	66%	28%	÷38	74%	41%	+33	
Average of differe	nce:		10%			+14%	



As we can see, when predispositions are controlled, the difference in believing that there was brutality between those who saw and did not see the police use force is reduced considerably -- it is cut from 38% to 10% among the faculty, and from 33% to 14% among students. There remains a real difference apparently due to actually seeing the police (as distinct from hearing about them from others or reading about them); but it is not very great, especially compared to the difference made by predispositions.



3. The effect of the police action was to increase acceptance of the sit-in demonstrations as justified from a small minority to a somewhat larger minority of both faculty and students; but not to change attitudes very much on the major stated issues.

Respondents were asked to recall their feelings when they first heard of the demonstrations, and then to report their current feelings.

"How did you feel when you <u>first</u> heard about the occupation of University buildings and offices by the demonstrators — at that time did you feel it was: definitely justified, probably justified, probably unjustified, definitely unjustified, I was undecided."

"Kow do you now feel about the action of the sit-ins?"

	Faculty			Students		
Total samples	Before	Now	"Change"	Before	Now	"Charge"
Probably or definitely justified	14%	.31%	+17	23%	42%	+19
Probably or definitely unjustified	75	64	-11	63	55	- 8
Undecided	1.1	3	- 8	14	3	<u>-11</u>
	100	100	100	-100	100	100
Those who saw police use of fo	orce					
Probably or definitely justifi	.ed 28	53	+25	31	60	+29
Those who did not see use of f						
Probably or definitely justifi	.ed 11	24	+13	16	33	+17

In this sense the police experience was "radicalizing" for those who underwent it, and there was also some spillover on the rest of the faculty and student body.

With respect to the six demands of the demonstrators, there is a much slighter effect, to the extent that people can accurately recall their previous. positions.



		Facu	lty	St	Students		
Total sample: % Favoring:	Sefore	Now	"Change"	Before	Now_	"Change"	
Stopping construction of Columbia gym in Morningside Park permanently	5 9 %	64%	+ 5	60%	61%	+1	
All judicial decisions on student discipline to be made at open hearings with due process, judged by a bi-					,		
partite committee of students and faculty	63	69	+1	77	78	÷ī	
University dropping legal charges against demonstrators arrested at gym site	54	58	+4	56	58	+2	
President Kirk and Trustee Burden to sever all membership in Executive Board of Institute for Defense Analysis	43	46	+3	48	50	+2	
Changing the rule against all demonstrations inside buildings	30	31	+1	39	39	0	
No disciplinary action against anyone in the demonstration (amnesty)	15	22	+7	25	30	+5	

Even on the issue of whether police force should ever be used, there is relatively little effect insofar as the respondents can recall their prior positions.

"If you can remember your opinions while the demonstrators were occupying the buildings, did you feel then that: police should be used to get them out without any offers of concessions; police should not be used if they were willing to compromise some of their demands, but should be used if they insisted on staying in until all their demands were met; police should not be used to get them out under any circumstances."

"How do you feel now about the use of police to remove the demonstrators?"



	:	Facult	<u>y</u>	Students		
Total sample	Before	Now	"Change"	Before	Now	"Change"
Use police without offers of concessions	18%	20%	+2	19%	17%	-2
Use police if sit-ins insist on all demands	48	43	- 5	40	34	-6
Police should not be used to get them out	28	31	+3	35	42	+7
Undecided	5 100	100	+1	6 100	7	+1

These figures suggest relatively little rejection of the general principle of police by those who had previously favored it, as a result of seeing the police in action. Overall, only a small minority favored using the police without an attempt at compromise. However, there remains an overall majority of both students and faculty who favored using police under some conditions -- either immediately or if the demonstrators refuse a compromise solution; a large majority of the faculty (about three quarters), and a bare majority of students (just over 50%).

The sit-in demonstrators were trying to change University policies and structures by the use of force: the physical occupation of buildings which were essential to the functioning of the University. The goals which they professed were widely accepted, because a majority of students and faculty felt that there was a need for change in certain policies -- particularly the relation of the University to the war and the ghetto -- and to change the decision-making process in the University itself. But in the last analysis, the reformist majority was willing to use police against the militant minority, to prevent minority domination. The demonstrations could raise issues, in a highly dramatic way; they could force the university community to confront problems which it had been ignoring; but in the last analysis, the university community did not propose to change from domination by the administration to domination by a radical

ERIC ority.

The police however create their own problems. The police behavior was such that there was a very widespread reaction against them, and against the administration's calling them in when it did. The most immediate outcome of the police action was the call for a general strike of students, joined in by the heads of a large number of student organizations previously not involved in the demonstrations. Support for this strike was expressed by only a minority of both the students and faculty responding so far; but among those who saw the police action the majority of both supported the strike at the time they filled out the questionnaire.

"Have you been in favor of the general student strike since the police Action?"

		Faculty				Students			
	Total	Saw force used		Differ- ence	Total	Saw force used		Differ- ence	
Yes	30	54	22	+32	42 48	61 30	33 54	÷28	
No Undecided	60 10	38 8	68 10		10	9	13		

We know that those who were on the scene when the police came included a larger than average share of those favorable to the demonstrations; when predispositions are controlled, it appears that self-selection accounts for most of the relationship between seeing the police action and supporting the strike among the faculty; and for about 2/3 of the percentage difference among the students. The impact of the police action was thus not particularly on those who actually saw it, but was general; it spread to all through talk and the mass media.



4. The Administration is widely criticized for not negotiating further, but there is widespread mistrust of the sit-in demonstration's leaders; neither side came out with much approval.

It is often said that in situations like the Columbia crisis, the university administration can only lose popularity; whatever it does will make a lot of people unhappy. The data seems to bear this out:

"What is your overall opinion of the way the administration has handled the crisis?"

	Faculty	Students
A good job	3%	3%
A fair job	2 8	18
A bad job	66	75
Undecided	3	4
	100	100

"Do you feel the Administration negotiated: too much, too little, about enough?"

	Faculty	Students	Berkeley students 1964
Too much	18%	13%	15%
About enough	20	15	33
Too little	59	58	43
Undecided	12	14	9
	100	100	100

Among these respondents the most widespread feeling is that the administration should have tried further negotiation; however 35% of the faculty and 23% of the students feel they negotiated either enough or too much.

Student attitudes are even more critical at Columbia than in Berkeley in 1964.

One result of the police action seems to have been an eroding of faith in the administration, particularly among the minority of both students and faculty who saw the police at work:

There seems to have been a widespread lack of confidence in the administration at the time of the survey, bust after the police action.



"Once the demonstration began, do you feel the administration acted in good faith or not?"

	FACULTY				STUDENTS				
	Total	Saw force used	Did not		Total	Saw force used	Did not		Berkeley Students 1964
Yes	43%	20%	51%	-31	30%	19%	35%	-16	55%
No	32	62	23		43	57	36		35
Don't know	25	18	26		27	24	29		10
	100	100	100		100	100	100		100

Once we control for predispositions, the difference between those who saw the police use of force and those who did not become much less (about a 10% difference compared with an uncontrolled difference of 31% for the faculty, about a 3% difference compared with 16% uncontrolled for the students. Objections to using police are thus clearly based on general predispositions to favor or oppose the demonstrations, rather than on specific individual experiences of seeing the police in action.

A parallel question about the leadership of the demonstrations however suggests that they did not gain too much from disillusionment with the administration:

"Do you feel that the leaders of the sit-in demonstration acted in good faith or not?"

	F.	ACULTY		STUDENTS			
	Total	Saw force used	Did not	Total	Saw force useJ	Did not_	
Yes	14%	26%	12%	24%	30%	19%	
No	59	52	62	47	44	51	
Don't know	27	21	25	29	26	30	
	100	100	100	100	100	100	



5. Attitudes toward the crisis are strongly related to dissatisfaction with the educational content and impersonality of the university.

Faculty and students were asked a set of seven questions about general satisfactions and dissatisfactions with the University, which had also been asked in the Berkeley studies.

"How well satisfied are you with courses, examinations, professors, etc. at the University?"

	Berkeley Studen					
	Faculty	Students	1964	1965	1968	
Very satisfied	11%)58	$\frac{19\%}{47})66$	$\frac{20\%}{62}$ 82	16%) 77	14%) 55)	
Satisfled	47)	47)	62)	, 61)	55)	
Unsatisfied	22	25	15	21	24	
Very unsatisfied	1	5	2	2	_	
DK or NA	19	4	1	0	2	
	100	100	100	100	100	

"Some of my classes are so large it is difficult for me to get anything out of them."

Strongly agree	4% 18	$\frac{12\%}{25}$)37	11%)34	$\frac{12\%}{22}$ 34
Mildly agree	$14)^{10}$	25)	23)	22)
Mildly disagree	14	25	30	42
Strongly disagree	29	32	33	18
DK or NA	40	6	3	6_
	100	100	100	100

"The problem with Columbia is that it is too big."

Strongly agree	4%) 20	$\frac{5\%}{17}$)22	14%)
Mildly agree	16)20	$17)^{22}$	29)
Mildly disagree	26	28	27
Strongly disagree	38	41	26
DK or NA	16	9	3
	100	100	100

"I feel that most of the professors are more interested in their research than in their students."

Strongly agree	12%)45	11%)37	14%)42	10%)36
Mildly agree	33)	26)	28)	26)
Mildly disagree	23	28	35	22
Strongly disagree	13	23	13	38
DK or NA	19	12	9	4
	100	100	100	100

"In my contacts with the administrative personnel, I have been treated with the consideration a human being deserves."

Strongly agree	26%) ₅₆	28%) 58	32%)
Mildly agree	26%) ₅₆	28%) ₅₈ 30)	32%) 36)
Mildly disagree	14	13	13
Strongly disagree	8	8	10
DK or NA	22	21	9
	100	100	100



"This university is an impersonal	Faculty l institution	Students on."	Berkeley students
Strongly agree Mildly agree Mildly disagree	22%) 40) 17	23%) 37) 13	22%) 41) 23
Strongly disagree DK, NA	3 13 100	$\frac{10}{\frac{7}{100}}$	$ \begin{array}{r} 13 \\ \underline{2} \\ 100 \end{array} $

"Taking everything into account, do you think Columbia is a good place to go to school?"

Yes			76%	79%
No			6	10
DK,	NA		18	11
		· 1	.00	100

These questions were formed into a simple score of basic satisfaction-dissatisfaction, ranging from 0 to 7. The scores for faculty and students both form practically normal distributions, with the greatest number in mid-scale.

		Faculty	Students
Completely dissatisfied	0	2%	3%
_	l	7	7
	2	14	16
	3	19	1 0
	4	19	22
	5	14	18
	6	7	12
Completely satisfied	7	_2	_6
		100	100

These basic satisfactions and dissatisfactions relate strongly to response to the campus crisis. The following table shows the percentage who hold various opinions in groups ranging from low to high basic satisfaction. For example, 57% of the most dissatisfied faculty members now feel the sit-ins were justified compared with 12% of the most satisfied faculty members.



Percentage holding various opinions in groups from low to high in satisfaction

	-		Dania	Ooti -i	faation	Score		Differ-
		0,1	2 2	. 3	4	5	6,7	ence
When first heard of	Faculty	29	18	13	13	7	12	+17
sit-ins, felt they were justified (%)	Students	32	30	23	16	18	12	+20
Now feel sit-ins	Faculty	57	41	35	25	19	12	+45
were justifiæd (%)	Students	56	49	47	38	34	30	+26
Shift in opi:Aon	Faculty	+ 28	+ 23	+ 22	+ 12	+ 12	0	
since police action	Students	+ 24	+ 19	+ 24	+ 22	+ 16	+ 18	
Favor goals of	Faculty	7 5	64	53	43	33	32	+43
demonstrations (%)	Students	77	71	67	58	55	41	+36
Favor tactics of	Faculty	27	12	11	7	6	7	+20
demonstrations (%)	Students	24	29	19	13	1.4	8	+16
Sit-ins only cffec-	Faculty	51	54	47	34	17	23	+28
tive way to stop gym (%)	Students	57	60	48	46	31	31	+26
Favor general strike	Faculty	58	41	33	22	18	7	+51
since police action (%)	Students	56	56	47	41	35	27	+29
Students should have	Faculty	73	54	63	55	39	32	+41
at least some power in major policies (%)	Students	88	81	76	76	67	60	+28
Now favor stopping	Faculty	88	74	65	60	59	48	+40
gym permanently (%)	Students	65	70	70	64	60	48	+17
Now favor no IDA	Faculty	71	56	49	43	32	32	+39
connections (%)	Students	68	64	60	50	43	36	+32
Now favor amnesty (%)	Faculty	42	24	22	16	19	9	+33
	Students	43	45	30	28	24	16	+27



6. The crisis greatly increased communications within the University, particularly direct, face-to-face talking about University problems; both faculty and students feel that whatever else happened, faculty-student relations are better than they were.

The Columbia crisis was different from most major events experienced by the faculty and students in that it was directly experienced. It was present and visible on campus, not located in Southeast Asia or even down the hill in Harlem. Of the faculty respondents, 94% were on campus on at least one of the eight days from the beginning of the sit-ins to the day after the police action; of the student respondents, 87% had been present on at least one day. (Those not present generally reported that they had deliberately avoided the campus during the crisis period.)

The major sources of information about the demonstrations for both students and faculty was "talking with people;" this was followed by the campus radio station, WKCR, which provided minute-by-minute live coverage from all over the campus And could be heard even by those living in the suburbs on its FM outlet, thus linking the scattered Columbia personnel into an instant community. Third most important for the faculty, and fourth for the students, were speeches and meetings -- more direct experience, in large groups rather than face-to-face conver-Third for the students and fourth for the faculty came the New York Times, the normal means by which Columbia people learn about major events on their campus and almost universally read by the educated classes of New York City. The Columbia Spectator, handicapped by an erratic distribution system (it is given away at various locations on campus, but one has to find these places and get one while they last), was a less important source, followed by petitions and leaflets, and finally by other newspapers and magazines, which rated among the three most important sources only for 13% of the faculty and 23% of the students. In general it is striking how similar the communications patterns for the students and the



faculty are: this probably reflects the fact that most of both groups live off campus, some in the Columbia area, some in the rest of the city, and some in the suburbs as commuters.

"What have been your major sources of information about the demonstrations?"


Checked as one of three most important by:

	Faculty	Students
Talking with people	82%	84%
WKCR radio	53	52
Speeches, meetings	52	38
New York Times	49	50
Columbia Spectator	30	36
Petitions, leaflets	22	21
Other newspapers, magazines	13	23

The crisis resulted in a greatly increased flow of communications within and between various strata of the university community. Using the method of asking people to recall how things were before the crisis, we asked:

"During this term, but before the demonstrations, how often did you talk seriously, face-to-face, with the following: senior faculty members, junior faculty members, members of the Administration, members of SDS or other radical groups, residents of Harlem?"

The same question was asked about the time since the demonstrations. The results show a considerable increase in the frequency of face-to-face talk within the faculty, and between faculty and the students. The SDS and other radical groups, with whom over half of both students and faculty had not talked previously during the term, greatly increased their conversations with both faculty and students. Conversations with members of the administration became more frequent for faculty members and students who had any at all, but about 40% of the faculty and 60% of the students remained untouched by such contacts. Informal communication with residents of Harlem was infrequent before the demonstrations for both students



'During this term, but before the demonstrations, how often did you talk seriously, face-to-face, with any of the following?

During the time since the demonstrations, how often have you talked seriously, face-to-face with the same groups?"

Faculty talked with:	I	Daily	Weekly	Monthly, less often	Never	No answer	
Senior faculty members:	Before	47%	29	18	4	2	100
	Since	69% +22	17	6	5	3	100
Junior faculty members:	Before	54	27	13	3	3	100
	Since	72 +18	17	6	3	2	100
Administration members:	Before	9	16	34	38	3	100
	Since	21	20	14	41	4	3.00
		+12	+ 4				
SDS, radical groups:	Before	3	10	28	56	3	100
•	Since	_25	22_	16	32	5	100
		+22	+12				
Residents of Harlem:	Before	2	7	23	65	3	100
	Since	4	11_	16	63	6	100
		+ 2	+ 4		,		
Students talked with:				· ·			
Senior faculty members:	Before	7	23	44	24	2	100
•	Since	23	33	18	23	2	100
		+16	+10				
Junior faculty members:	Before	12	3 0	36	19	3	100
	Since	33	31	13	19	4	100
•	_	+21	+1				
Administration members:	Before	2	5	31	60	2	100
		6	14	14	62	4	100
		+ 4	+ 9				
SDS, radical groups:	Before	5	15	26	52	2	100
	Since	30	18	13	36	3	100
		+25	+ 3				
Residents of Harlem:	Before	4	6	23	64	3	100
	Since	_6	13	15	62	4	100
•		+ 2	+ 7				



It is clear that the crisis activated a great deal of serious, face-to-face conversation within and between students and faculty; but relatively fewer had direct conversations with members of the Administration, a much smaller group than the 2,000 faculty members or the 17,000 students. The students and faculty remain almost completely isolated by barriers of ghetto ecology, class and race from the residents of Harlem. Cross-tabulations (not given here) indicate that those who directly experienced the police action were particularly affected; the frequency of their discussions with others increased considerably more than that of people who did not see the police action.

When people were asked about the opinions of the demonstrations held by their close friends, before and after the police action, over 40% of each group reported that their friends were split or neutral before the bust; this declined to about 1/3 within each group after the police action. There is some evidence that there may be a polarization beginning, in which demonstration sympathizers at least are becoming surrounded with like-minded people and are not exposed to contrary opinions. This could have serious consequences for the quality of communications within the University.

To assess the effects of the crisis will require long-term study of the situation, but we asked the participants for their immediate judgment. For what they are worth, here are the opinions of the students and faculty:

"It has been suggested that the demonstrations have had various effects on the campus community. Do you think the demonstrations have had the following effects:

		ŕ		No		Net: better
Faculty answers:	Better	Same	Worse	answer		minus worse
Student-faculty relations	63%	12	17	8	100	+46 %
Student-administration rel.	7	13	71	9	100	-64
Relations among students	33	15	. 39	13	100	- 6
Relations among faculty	36	15	39	10	100	- 3
Relations with Harlem	19	38	23	20∙	100	- 4



Student answers:	Better	Same	Worse	No answer		Net: better minus worse
Student-faculty relations	73%	12	8	7	100	+65
Student-administration rel.	12	17	63	8	100	-51
Relations among students	41	19	33	7	100	+ 8
Relations among faculty	31	17	33	19	100	·- 2
Relations with Harlem	28	30	25	17	100	+ 3

Large majorities of both students and faculty feel that the demonstrations have resulted in better student-faculty relations. This is in spite of the fact that, as we have seen, both students and faculty are deeply split in their attitude toward the demonstrations, the necessity of using the police, and the subsequent student strike; and the fact that our respondents themselves do not report any net improvement in intra-student or intra-faculty relations. Further analysis of the responses, and perhaps the passage of time, will be required to understand this paradox. Apparently the demonstrations and the events around them did reveal consensus within and between both students and faculty on some major issues: more joint faculty-student responsibility for discipline, stopping the gym project at least in its present form, and the need for structural change to increase the responsiveness of the University policies to faculty, student, and community sentiments.

Out of the conflict came a shared experience, and an increase in "serious, face-to-face talk" about both the differences of opinion and the common concerns of the students and faculty. It is most unlikely that the participants in this serious talking will reach agreement on all issues of University or general social policy. But if they can find a way of living together and continuing the conversation, without actions which outrage and alienate one another, there could indeed be a renewed University. Without the "confrontation," would there have been the conversation? Can the conversation continue, or will confrontation become an end in itself?



7. Attitudes toward the demonstrations and their goals were strongly related to attitude toward the war in Vietnam, but completely unrelated to the draft status of the individual student.

Students were asked whether they were eligible for the draft, and if so, what they thought their chances were of actually being drafted in the next year or two. They were also asked about their attitude toward the war in Vietnam:

Would you please indicate whether you agree with the following statement:

I was in favor of United States withdrawal from Vietnam before President Johnson announced he was not running for re-election.

Yes 70% Mixed feelings 15% No 13%

We combined these two questions to classify people by their attitude toward the war and their draft status, and examined how each type of student responded to the demonstrations.

Percent who favored main goals of demonstrations

	Chance of being drafted 50-50 or more	Eligible but not likely to be drafted	Men not eligible for draft	Women
Favored U.S. withdrawal (anti-war)	75%	76%	71%	7 5%
Opposed with- drawal or had mixed feelings	18%	29%	22%	20%

Among those who were against the war (favored withdrawal) about 75% favored the main goals of the demonstrations regardless of the draft status of the individual; among those who supported the war or had mixed feelings, only around 20% favored the main goals of the demonstrations.

Support of the tactics of the demonstrations was, as we have seen, far less than support of their goals; but where it exists, it is found among opponents of the war, and is unrelated to individual draft status:



Percent who favored the tactics of the demonstrations

	Chance of being drafted 50-50 or more	Eligible but not likely to be drafted	Men not eligible for draft	Women
Favored U.S. withdrawal (anti-war)	24%	29%	28%	22%
Opposed with- drawal or had mixed feelings	; 0	3%	4%	2 %

If we consider actually sitting in one of the buildings, the percents are still lower, but the pattern is similar:

Percent who sat in

	Chance of being drafted 50-50 or more	Eligible but not likely to be drafted	Men not eligible for draft	Women
Favored U.S. withdrawal (anti-war)	8%	13%	12%	5%
Opposed with- drawal or had mixed feelings	o	3%	o	o

It is thus absolutely not true that worry over one's own chances of being drafted is a factor in the discontent or the special manifestations which it takes in the Columbia situation. What is a factor is the generalized unhappiness with the war, and this applies to everyone regardless of draft status.

The draft is probably not irrelevant to this unhappiness, but it makes everyone unhappy, regardless of their expectations of being drafted. This effect is similar to what we have found in studies of ghetto riots: the riots take place almost entirely in areas of high unemployment and poverty, but the employed in those areas are just as likely to participate as the unemployed. The effect of massed unemployment and poverty is not only on the immediate victims but on the entire ghetto community as well: all are unhappy with the situation, and there is a sense of solidarity, a community climate of resentment and resistence. The cure for the discontent must come by changing the climate of the community,



by giving its members believable evidence that major changes are actually happening. I believe this applies also to student unrest.

On the Columbia campus, 70% of the students and 69% of the faculty responding to our survey were opposed to the war in Vietnam. Only 15% of the students thought that the chances were at least 50-50 of their being drafted in the next year or two. But there is a sense of solidarity in outrage which affects the entire community, potential draftees and those not eligible alike.

Moreover, the students who are opposed to the war are also strong supporters of the poor and the black people of the country in their protests. About 75% of those who opposed the war, but only one-third of those who did not oppose the war, agreed with the statement:

"I support the idea of the Poor People's march on Washington to achieve more for black people and the poor."

About half of the anti-war people, compared with ony 20% of those who did not oppose the war, agreed with the statement:

"I am in favor of many of the goals of the Black Power movement."

Opposition to the war is thus linked to opposition to poverty and racial injustice at home, and both are linked to demands for change in the university to give students and faculty more say in its policies. In the universities, as in the ghettoes, there is a sense that something is wrong with society, and a deeply moralistic demand that something be done about it quickly.

Most of the students want an end to massive American involvement in the Vietnam war, and the use of the resources so freed to end poverty and slums in America in the near future. These are major changes, but they do not appear in themselves to require any basic restructuring of American society -- only a shifting of priorities and resources within the existing system. At this point only a small minority accepts the belief of the radical leaders that these changes cannot be brought about without revolutionary action. What happens in the future depends on whether the affluent majority of older Americans who have so far tolerated war and poverty can respond to these impatient, moralistic young people.

8. The political preferences of the anti-war, anti-poverty majority of students and faculty have so far offered them a legitimate outlet for protest in the larger society but this may now be foreclosed, with radical consequences.

The two candidates now considered most likely to be nominated for the presidency, Humphrey and Nixon, received little support from either students or faculty. The survey was of course taken just before the death of Robert Kennedy. The three most popular candidates were McCarthy, Rockefeller, and Kennedy, in that order.

	Students	Faculty	
McCarthy	46%	51%	
Rockefeller	21	17	
Kennedy	18	14	
Humphrey	7	12	
Nixon	4 .	4	
Other	4	3	
Undecided	10	11	
	116%	111%	

(Percentages are over 100% because some named two choices; 7% of students and 4% of faculty favored both McCarthy and Rockefeller; 5% of students and 4% of faculty favored both McCarthy and Kennedy.)

Choice of candidates is strongly related to the war issue. Seventy percent of both students and faculty opposed the war; the rest divided evenly between those who had "mixed feelings" and those who supported the war. Among this large anti-war majority, Humphrey and Nixon got virtually no support; the Humphrey and Nixon supporters came mainly from the minority which supported the war. Rockefeller draws support from both camps, but more from the pro-war groups.

	ANTI-WAR		MIXED FEELINGS		PRO-WAR	
McCarthy	Students 57%	Faculty 67%	Students 31%	Faculty 25%	Students 10%	Faculty 8%
Rockefeller	17	14	32	27	31	27
Kennedy	21	16	17	11	6	6
Humphrey	3	5	15	18	19	41
Nixon	2	1	11	7	29	21
Other	4	1	2	1	4	2
Undecided	11	9	17	22	16	18
	115%	113%	125%	111%	113%	123%



Students were asked whether they were eligible for the draft, and if so what they thought their chances were of actually being drafted in the next year or two. Only 16% thought their chances of being drafted in the next year or two were 50-50 or higher; 22% were eligible but felt they weren't likely to be drafted in the next year or two; 36% were men no eligible, and 27% were women. We combined the question of draft status with the question on attitude toward the war, and examined how each type of student felt about various issues, including the election candidates:

Percent of students favoring the various candidates

McC Among students who oppose the war and are:	arthy	Ken- nedy	Hum- phrey	Rocke- feller	Nixon	Other	Unde- cided	Total Total
Eligible, 50-50 chance to be drafted	55%	22	4	25	2	4	4	113% (212)
Eligible but less than 50-50	5 7 %	25	4	21	1	5	6	119% (285)
Men not eligible	52%	2 0	2	18	3	4	11	110% (400)
Women	61%	21	4	11	2	3	10	112% (359)
Among students who favor the war or have mixed feelings and are:								
Eligible, 50-50 chance to be drafted	e 25%	16	16	32	21	0	17	127% (71)
Eligible but less than 50-50	26%	13	16	32	18	4	13	122% (103)
Men not eligible	16%	10	17	32	20	3	14	112% (228)
Women	21%	12	1.9	29	18	4	19	121% (112)



Worry over one's own chances of being drafted has nothing to do with support of anti-war candidates. This does not mean that the draft has no effect on the campus, but rather that it makes everyone unhappy, both the eligible and ineligible, the men and the women, the students and the faculty. The draft brings an unpopular war home to the campus, making it an unavoidable moral issue for all. This adds to the fervor with which students worked for McCarthy and Kennedy. The anti-war people are also strongly concerned with the elimination of poverty and racial injustice at home.

What will happen if the anti-war majority of students and faculty are confronted with a Humphrey-Nixon campaign this fall? Those who put so much work and passion into the McCarthy and Kennedy campaigns will have seen the results of their efforts swept away by a single act of violence. At the time of this survey both Humphrey and Nixon were identified as pro-war candidates. If the candidates maintain these positions into the campaign -- and it is very difficult to see how either could become a plausible "peace candidate" in the eyes of the students and teachers -- the great majority of Columbia students and faculty, and others like them throughout the country, will be extremely alienated from normal politics.

Some may withdraw in disgust, but the war and the draft of students make it almost impossible for students or professors to retire into their ivory towers. "Only" 16% of the students at Columbia expect to be drafted in the next couple of years, but this is sufficient to involve all the students and teachers very deeply in the issue of the war.

There is therefore a distinct possibility that the massive civil disobedience practiced by a campus minority this spring may be transferred to the national political arena this fall, with widespread support from students and teachers.



Massive confrontations and illegal demonstrations against the candidates, the draft, and the war would in turn bring demands for stern enforcement of "law and order," which would carry the process of alienation further in a vicious circle, widening the "generation gap" and the political division in the country. The effect of alienating a generation of students and a large section of the intellectuals from normal political channels can be very serious both for the universities and the nation, as demonstrated in France, Italy, and some East European countries.

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